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Inicio Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa EARNINGS BENCHMARKS EN EL SECTOR HOTELERO: DECISIONES BASADAS EN VARIABLES FINAN...
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Vol. 17. Issue 1.
Pages 113-135 (January - April 2011)
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Vol. 17. Issue 1.
Pages 113-135 (January - April 2011)
Open Access
EARNINGS BENCHMARKS EN EL SECTOR HOTELERO: DECISIONES BASADAS EN VARIABLES FINANCIERAS Y REALES
EARNINGS BENCHMARKS IN THE SPANISH HOTEL INDUSTRY: DECISIONS BASED ON FINANCIAL AND REAL VARIABLES
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Parte Esteban Lauraa,1, M Jesús Such Devesaa,b
a Departamento de Economía de la Empresa y Contabilidad, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Paseo Senda del Rey, 11, E-28040, MADRID, España
b Departamento de Estadística, Estructura Económica y Organización Económica Internacional, Universidad de Alcalá, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Antiguo Colegio de Mínimos, Plaza de la Victoria, 2, E-28802, Alcalá de Henares, MADRID, España
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RESUMEN

Este trabajo se centra en la gestión del resultado hacia unos umbrales de rentabilidad que se consideran críticos: evitar declarar pérdidas y descensos en resultados, en una muestra de empresas hoteleras. El estudio empírico se divide en dos etapas. En primer lugar, se plantean los histogramas de frecuencias para detectar la existencia de una discontinuidad en torno a cero. En segundo lugar, se analiza la incidencia de los ajustes por devengo discrecionales y otra serie de variables financieras en los intervalos críticos de pequeñas pérdidas (pequeños descensos en resultados) frente a pequeños beneficios (incrementos en resultados). La evidencia empírica obtenida en la muestra de empresas hoteleras no permite rechazar la hipótesis de evitar declarar pequeñas pérdidas. La comparación de las empresas que no alcanzan los umbrales de rentabilidad frente a las que consiguen sobrepasarlos apoya la idea de que existe una conducta diferenciada si se atiende a un conjunto de variables y ratios financieros.

CLASIFICACIÓN JEL:
M40
L83
PALABRAS CLAVE:
Earnings Benchmarks
Gestión del Resultado
Decisiones Basadas en Variables Reales
Decisiones Basadas en Variables Financieras
Sector Hotelero
ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on earnings benchmarks using a sample of Spanish hotel firms. In particular, we examine two earnings benchmarks: loss avoidance and earnings decreases avoidance. First, we use frequency histograms to detect a discontinuity around zero. Second, we use discretionary accruals and other variables to analyze the existence of a different behaviour between firms just miss the benchmark and firms just beat the benchmark.

The results show that managers of Spanish hotel firms avoid reporting losses. It is also detected that firms just beat the benchmark present different profile in fundamental variables in relation to firms just miss the benchmark.

JEL CLASSIFICATION:
M40
L83
KEY WORDS:
Earnings Benchmarks
Earnings Management
Financial Activities
Real Activities
Hotel Industry
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El autor agradece la ayuda recibida de CIFF (Centro Internacional de Formación Financiera) para la elaboración del presente artículo

Copyright © 2011. Academia Europea de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa
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