Información del artículo
RESUMEN
La literatura ha puesto en cuestión si realmente las grandes diferencias retributivas entre directivos están vinculadas con mejores resultados de la organización. En este trabajo, sobre la base de los argumentos de la teoría del torneo, se ha tratado de aportar nuevas evidencias en esta línea, utilizando para ello datos de las 120 empresas españolas que cotizan en Bolsa. Los resultados obtenidos, considerando la forma convexa en las relaciones dispersión-resultados de Brown et al. (2003) y las características del trabajo directivo–alto nivel jerárquico, interdependencia moderada y alta incertidumbre-, indican que existe una relación positiva, aunque moderada por ciertas variables, entre dispersión retributiva y resultados de la empresa.
CLASIFICACIÓN JEL:
M52
PALABRAS CLAVE:
Dispersión retributiva
Teoría del torneo
Resultados de la empresa
Factores moderadores
ABSTRACT
Literature has tried to report whether high compensation differences between executives are linked to better firm performance. This study, based on tournament theory arguments, has attempted to provide new evidences in this line of research, using a sample of 120 Spanish listed firms. Results, taking into account convex shape in the dispersion-performance relationships reported by Brown et al. (2003) and the characteristics of executive job–high hierarchy level, moderate interdependence, and high complexity-, indicate a positive, although moderated, relationships between executive pay dispersion and firm performance.
KEY WORDS:
Executive pay dispersion
Tournament theory
Firm performance
Moderating factors
JEL CLASSIFICATION:
M52
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1 Este trabajo ha sido financiado por la Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia, a través del Proyecto 11837/PHCS/09. El autor agradece los valiosos comentarios y sugerencias de los dos revisores que han contribuido, sin duda, a la significativa mejora de este trabajo.
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