Neurofenomenología. Proyecto para una ciencia de la experiencia vivida*

Información del artículo

Resumen

Introducción

La ciencia cognitiva, desde mediados del siglo XX, es reconocida ampliamente como el área de convergencia genuina de todos los avances científicos relacionados con el estudio de la mente humana y los mecanismos que posibilitan el conocimiento. Se ha constituido desde entonces como un espacio multidisciplinar, en el que los intereses investigativos de diferentes actores y disciplinas han adquirido carta de ciudadanía, y han permitido novedosas esperanzas respecto al estudio de las particularidades humanas desde perspectivas científicas.

Objetivos

Este trabajo propone evaluar críticamente la inclusión de discusiones que la biología teórica ha estado asumiendo en su discurso, respecto al estudio del fenómeno cognitivo; principal atención merece el proyecto enactivo, y de manera extensiva, la neurofenomenología de Francisco J. Varela.

Desarrollo

A través de una corta y comprimida historia de la ciencia cognitiva estableceremos los puntos clave para entender el surgimiento de la postura enactiva y el giro corporizado influido por la fenomenología continental en la ciencia cognitiva, así como los lineamientos generales de la neurofenomenología.

Conclusiones

El problema duro de la conciencia aún se enfrenta a varios reduccionismos, que relegan lo cognitivo a un tipo de mecanismo exclusivamente racional, individualizado, abstracto e incorpóreo, lo que ha permitido el fortalecimiento del paradigma funcionalista en la filosofía de la mente. Una solución a las dicotomías clásicas en las ciencias de la mente debe empezar, a nuestro parecer, con un rechazo a estas asunciones.

Palabras clave:

Enacción

neurofenomenología

ciencia cognitiva

acoplamiento sensorio motriz

Abstract

Introduction

Since the middle of 20th Century, cognitive science has been recognized as the genuine convergence field for all scientific advances in human mind studies with the mechanisms enabling knowledge. Since then, it has become a multidisciplinary area where several research disciplines and actors have acquired citizenship, allowing new expectations on the scientific study of human uniqueness.

Objectives

Critical assessment of the discussion that the discourse of theoretical biology has been assuming regarding the study of the cognitive phenomenon with special attention to the enactive project and, extensively, to the neuro-phenomenology of Francisco J. Varela.

Methods

Starting with a brief and synthesized history of cognitive science, we will establish the key principles for understanding the emergence of the enactive paradigm and the “embodied” turn influenced by continental phenomenology in the cognitive science, as well as the general guidelines of Neurophenomenology.

Conclusions

The “hard problem” of consciousness still faces several types of reductionism relegating the cognitive issue to a kind of merely rational, individual, abstract and disembodied mechanism, thus strengthening the functionalist paradigm in mind philosophy. A solution to classic dichotomies in mind sciences must start rejecting such assumptions.

Key words:

Enactive

neurophenomenology

cognitive science

sensorimotor coupling

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Este artículo debe su elaboración a la influencia del ilustre neurobiólogo y filósofo chileno Francisco Varela García (1946-2001). Supone, además, el esfuerzo por elaborar un merecido reconocimiento a su obra en el décimo aniversario de su muerte.

Conflictos de interés: El autor manifiesta que no tiene conflictos de interés en este artículo.

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