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Vol. 27. Issue 120.
Pages 127-145 (July - September 2011)
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Vol. 27. Issue 120.
Pages 127-145 (July - September 2011)
Open Access
Políticas De Incentivos Relacionadas Con La Investigación:Una Revisión Crítica Desde La Teoría De Contratos
Research incentive policies: a critical review based on the Theory of Contracts
Políticas de incentivos relacionadas com a investigação: uma revisão crítica da Teoria dos Contratos
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1902
Alexander Guzmán Vásquez
Profesor Asociado, Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA, Colombia
María Andrea Trujillo Dávila
Corresponding author
maria.trujillo@cesa.edu.co

Autor para correspondencia. Dirigir correspondencia a: Diagonal 34A No. 5A – 57 Segundo Piso, Casa Rocha, Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA, Bogotá, Colombia.
Profesora Asociada, Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA, Colombia
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Resumen

Las universidades colombianas tradicionalmente estuvieron enfocadas en la docencia. Algunas de ellas, públicas y privadas, han reconfigurado su visión y desarrollado políticas para incorporar la investigación entre sus prioridades ofreciendo incentivos a las publicaciones y buscando que a través de estas, los profesores generen conocimiento y lo divulguen en revistas indexadas nacionales e internacionales, libros de investigación, o participen en congresos y eventos académicos. Este artículo pretende resaltar el valor de la Teoría de Contratos para entender la política de estímulos a la investigación en instituciones de educación superior colombianas, realizando una revisión a los principales aportes teóricos respecto al problema de riesgo moral y discutiendo las políticas de incentivos a la investigación con este marco teórico.

Palabras clave:
Riesgo moral
investigación
docencia
políticas de incentivos
Abstract

Universities in Colombia initially focused on teaching. Some of them, both public and private, have reconsidered their vision and have developed policies aimed at incorporating research into their priorities. Clear mechanisms of incentives for publication have been designed for the purpose of getting faculty members involved in the production of knowledge and the divulging of results through national and international indexed journals, books based on research findings, and academic conferences and events. This article aims to highlight the value of Contract Theory in order to provide an understanding of the research incentive policy at Colombian universities, conducting a review of major theoretical contributions to moral hazard problems and discussing research incentive policies in the light of these concepts.

Keywords:
Moral hazard
research
teaching
incentive policy
Resumo

Tradicionalmente, as universidades colombianas sempre estiveram focadas no ensino. Algumas delas, públicas e privadas, reconfiguraram sua visão e desenvolveram políticas para incorporar a investigação entre suas prioridades. Nessas instituições se oferecem incentivos as publicações, tentando que através da investigação os professores gerem conhecimento e o divulguem em revistas indexadas nacionais e internacionais, livros de investigação, ou na participação em congressos e eventos acadêmicos. Esse artigo pretende realçar o valor da Teoria dos Contratos para entender a política de estímulos a investigação em instituições de educação superior colombianas, realizando uma revisão as principais contribuições teóricas sobre o problema do risco moral e discutindo a política de incentivos para a investigação no âmbito deste quadro teórico.

Palavras-chave:
Risco moral
investigação
docência
políticas de incentivos
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Los autores agradecen a los profesores del seminario de Teoría de Contratos del Doctorado en Administración de la Universidad de los Andes, doctores Francisco Azuero y Juan Benavides, por sus valiosos aportes y seguimiento en la elaboración de este artículo como trabajo final del seminario en mención. Igualmente, a los pares anónimos de Estudios Gerenciales por sus valiosas sugerencias.

Copyright © 2011. Universidad ICESI
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